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A B S T R A C T
Research on power-sharing in Africa remains silent on the effects of national
peace agreements on the sub-national level. Conversely, most armed conﬂicts
originate and are fought in (or over) speciﬁc areas. A plausible hypothesis
would be that for power-sharing to have the desired pacifying effect throughout
the national territory, it needs to be extended to the local level. Based
on ﬁeldwork in six former hotspots in Liberia, Burundi and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) we ﬁnd that there is hardly any local content,
including local power-sharing, in national agreements. However, contrary to
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our hypothesis, neither local content (inclusion of actors or interest) nor local-
power-sharing (either introducing a local power balance or monopoly) are
indispensable to effectively bring about local peace, at least in the short-term.
On the contrary, it might even endanger the peace process. The importance of
the sub-national level is overestimated in some cases and romanticised in others.
However, the history of spatial-political links, centralised policies, and the
establishment of local balances or monopolies of power ultimately play an
important role.
Since the s, the international community has signiﬁcantly ex-
panded its efforts to end internal wars in Africa. In most cases, these
efforts have involved peace agreements between insurgent groups and
incumbent leaders, often resulting in temporary power-sharing govern-
ments of national unity. No fewer than  out of  peace accords
signed between  and  in Africa stipulated some form of power-
sharing between incumbent leaders and rebel groups to end civil war
and restore political order (Mehler ). Recently, the practice has
also been extended to countries affected by election-related violence,
i.e. Kenya and Zimbabwe. This empirical trend has been followed by
researchers, who have questioned whether power-sharing is an effective
tool of conﬂict management and whether its growing popularity is
justiﬁed by the results (Hartzell & Hoddie , ; Roeder &
Rothchild ; Tull & Mehler ; Pearson et al. ; Sriram ;
Mehler ). Although this emerging body of work has enhanced our
understanding of power-sharing in itself, there is no consensus on its
overall effects on peace (for a summary see Williams ; see also
Lemarchand ). Most qualitative oriented research appears to be
sceptical about the peace-promoting effects of power-sharing, including
its unintended consequences (Roeder & Rothchild ; Tull & Mehler
; Pearson et al. ; Sriram ; Mehler ). Conversely, most
quantitative studies tend to conclude that power-sharing provisions
foster post-war peace (Hoddie & Hartzell ; Jarstad & Nilsson ).
By and large, both qualitative and quantitative research about power-
sharing remains focused on the national, aggregate level. However,
there are good reasons to consider the local level to understand the
dynamics of peace in post-conﬂict settings. We deﬁne ‘the local’, or
‘local arena’ as we call it, as territorial and administrative units outside
the capital and below national state institutions, that is, the sub-national
level. In our case studies this refers to urban provincial/county capitals
(Goma and Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ganta
and Gbarnga in Liberia, Gitega and Bubanza in Burundi), as well as
rural areas (Kalehe and Sake in the DRC, the rural areas around
 C L A U D I A S I M O N S E T A L .
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Gitega and Bubanza in Burundi). The choice of districts and smaller pro-
vinces is random, but only to an extent, in that we sought to select units
of analysis that are large enough to be of potential political signiﬁcance
vis-à-vis the national but small enough to enable us to identify relevant
local actors, their interests and interactions, allowing us to establish links
between local places, actors and interests. We acknowledge that both
actors and concerns on local and national levels are interlinked in
manifold ways. Furthermore, the multi-scalar nature of the conﬂicts in
the DRC, Burundi and Liberia, and the divergent territorial conﬁgur-
ation of the three countries should guard us against unduly generalising
about diverse conceptions of the local. We understand local interests
and concerns as those of local power holders, which can be at odds with
the concerns of the broader population or other powerful local actors.
Why should the local level matter for the success or failure of a peace
process? Violence and conﬂict do not hit a country evenly. In most
armed conﬂicts there are hotspots in speciﬁc areas, which should be
considered when evaluating the effect of power-sharing. In some cases
national peace is restored as a result of an agreement, whilst conﬂict or
insecurity continues in these local hotspots. There are three interrelated
reasons for this. First, national peace agreements often fail to address
local causes of conﬂict. This implies, second, that the interests of local
actors are excluded. This has an impact on conﬂict dynamics, especially
when these actors are able to mobilise violence in defence of their
interests. Third, actors agreeing on peace at the national level might not
represent cohesive organisations, and thus may not be able to effectively
control their local followers. When the latter do not ﬁnd their interests
taken into consideration by their leaders turned ministers, generals
etc., they may continue to ﬁght, derailing the peace process.
Consequently, it is arguable that the inclusion of local actors and
interests in national power-sharing agreements – broadly conceived as
‘local content’ or the extension of power-sharing to the local level (local
power-sharing) – contributes to sustainable peace.
Looking at six case studies of local arenas (i.e. former hotspots) in
three countries (Liberia, Burundi, DRC) we ﬁnd, perhaps surprisingly,
hardly any local content (of either actors or concerns) in national
power-sharing agreements whilst outcomes of local power-sharing are
uneven. However, we suggest that contrary to our hypothesis, the involve-
ment of the local, in terms of local content or local power-sharing, is not
a necessary condition for national power-sharing to effectively bring
about local peace. On the contrary, local power-sharing might even
endanger peace processes. We conclude that the importance of the
P O W E R - S H A R I N G I N A F R I C A ’ S W A R Z O N E S
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sub-national level tends to be overestimated in some cases – at least in
the short-term – and romanticised as an ever-effective device in others.
Eventually other context conditions will determine what effect local
power-sharing will have.
T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F T H E L O C A L L E V E L
Agreement among the elites of warring factions is a necessary condition
for peace. Power-sharing accords may enable this, insofar as every
faction gains access to power and resources, providing an effective
incentive to stop ﬁghting. But it may not be a sufﬁcient condition.
Power-sharing agreements do not automatically imply that peace,
agreed upon by a narrow circle of elites in the capital, trickles down to
the rest of the country. National peace (negatively deﬁned) is sometimes
cited as achieved, even though violence persists in the hinterlands.
Moreover, most armed conﬂicts are not territorially uniform phenom-
ena. They originate and are fought in (or over) speciﬁc areas. Local
interests and concerns are often the basis of mobilisation (Fearon &
Laitin ).
An extreme and prominent case of this decoupling of national and
local peace is the DRC. After years of civil war, the power-sharing agree-
ment of  quickly unfolded positive results on the national level. The
principal leaders of warring factions took up positions in the central
government and other state institutions. However, in the eastern pro-
vinces of North and South Kivu, armed conﬂict remained pervasive.
To this day, militias and rebel groups continue to ﬁght each other and
the government army. Meanwhile, following the  ‘post-conﬂict’
elections, donors and international organisations have continued to
describe the DRC as a ‘post-conﬂict’ country, ignoring the continu-
ation of armed conﬂict in an important part of the country
(Autesserre ).
The DRC illustrates the importance of looking beyond the macro-
political level and its national players in order to explore the process and
consequences of power-sharing on the sub-national level. This idea
mirrors research arguing that among the various core dimensions of
power-sharing, territorial power-sharing – accords over territorial auton-
omy for regions and provinces – is a more powerful mechanism to secure
peace than political or economic power-sharing (Hoddie & Hartzell
; Jarstad & Nilsson ; but see Lake & Rothchild ). The
supposed effectiveness of territorial power-sharing points to the
relevance of sub-national dynamics for transitions from war to peace.
 C L A U D I A S I M O N S E T A L .
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We propose three interrelated arguments to explain why elite pacts do
not necessarily imply the end of hostilities in the hinterlands.
First, most elite pacts do not address the underlying structural causes
of conﬂict, often deferring the resolution of structural causes to
subsequent governments (Le Van : ). As many conﬂicts originate
in speciﬁc areas, conﬂict causes will therefore also often pertain to cer-
tain regions or localities. Yet, local grievances and access to local
(political or economic) opportunities are largely ignored by national
peace accords. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that the conﬂict will
resume again.
Second, the negligence of local causes of conﬂict also implies
the neglect of local actors and their interests. A growing body of
literature has criticised the statist, blueprint-like machinery of top-down
peace-building for its propensity to pay insufﬁcient attention to local
politics, in the process inhibiting the emergence of a self-sustaining
peace (Richmond a, b; Autesserre ; MacGinty ).
This scholarship is relevant for our research by emphasising that ‘the
local’ is not simply at the receiving end of a peace negotiated elsewhere.
On the contrary, it is argued that ‘the local’ has considerable agency to
derail, reframe or otherwise inﬂuence peace building.
Third, to have broadly pacifying effects, an elite bargain presumes a
top-downprocess implemented by relatively cohesive organisations.How-
ever, most conﬂict actors have roots in particular regions and among
particular constituencies with distinct local concerns (see Manning
, ; Curtis & De Zeeuw ). Hierarchies and command
structures are often contested, resulting in a possible disconnect be-
tween the national and local level. There is ample evidence that political
formations in contemporary Africa, particularly insurgencies, lack
organisational cohesion and are prone to defections, fragmentation
and factionalism (Bøås & Dunn ; Weinstein ; Schlichte ;
Reno ; Cunningham et al. ).
In summary, what is missing from existing studies to date is an analysis
of whether and how agreements are translated to or adapted at the sub-
national level beyond the conﬁnes of central government institutions, an
instrument we deﬁne as local power-sharing. It is also not understood
whether and to what extent local actors and local concerns are taken
into consideration in elite-based negotiations, an inclusion we refer to as
local content.
There are at least two ways in which local content in power-sharing
agreements may address the sub-national level. First, either local
concerns or actors can be included, i.e. powerful local actors are either
P O W E R - S H A R I N G I N A F R I C A ’ S W A R Z O N E S
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
directly involved in power-sharing negotiations or later in the process of
implementation. Alternatively, elites involved in power-sharing can
identify and address speciﬁc local concerns and grievances, either in
the negotiation phase or subsequently in the transitional government.
Second, power-sharing can be taken to the sub-national level. There are
two distinct ways for this ‘local power-sharing’ to occur. Either a national
peace agreement is replicated at the local level, thereby reproducing
power-sharing formulas locally between two or more formerly conﬂict-
ing parties. This can concern political, military and economic positions
that are both shared nationally and at the local level. Alternatively,
local power-sharing may mean that territories are divided among
different actors. This often amounts to maintaining the war-time status
quo (Jarstad & Nilsson : ). Such an acknowledgement of
local monopolies of power (as opposed to a local balancing when power
is shared among different factions) can erase a security dilemma for
rebel groups, encouraging them to put down arms. In the remainder of
this article we distinguish between local balances of power and the
juxtaposition of local monopolies of power as two forms of local power-
sharing.
We are interested in the empirically observable manifestations of
power-sharing agreements outside of the political centre, on the sub-
national level. We essentially pursue two research questions: First, was
the local level considered in national power-sharing pacts? Second, what
was the impact of the (non-)consideration of the local level on peace?
As Africa is the continent where by far the most power-sharing accords
have been signed, we chose to analyse power-sharing processes in three
African countries (Liberia, Burundi, DRC) and explore their impact on
the local level. These countries share a long history of violent conﬂict,
ended (formally) by power-sharing agreements in the early s.
They make interesting country examples for their similarities and
differences: historically centralised systems of governance (all three);
intense conﬂict periods (all three); inclusiveness of formal conﬂict
groups in the agreement (all three to varying degrees) and geographical
sizes (tiny Liberia and Burundi versus DRC). Moreover, as we show, the
agreements vary between a high level of local power-sharing (DRC) to
some degree of local power-sharing (Burundi) and ﬁnally to none at all
(Liberia). This illustrates the importance of contextualisation when
considering the importance of the local in peace agreements.
Our methodological approach assumes that power-sharing among
national elites may have diverse consequences that belie simple dicho-
tomous assessments (peace vs. continued armed conﬂict). The ultimate
 C L A U D I A S I M O N S E T A L .
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test for the effectiveness of power-sharing agreements are those areas
and regions that were heavily affected by violence, prior to a peace
agreement. If these ‘former’ hotspots of conﬂict remain violent, the
very objective of a peace accord remains elusive. We conducted ex-
tensive ﬁeldwork in six local arenas (two in each country) to investigate
the pacifying effect of power-sharing on the local level, looking for
local arrangements and adaptations that may account for divergent
outcomes. The ﬁndings are based on a total of  individual semi-
structured interviews as well as  focus group discussions (FDGs)
conducted in Liberia, Burundi and the DRC between June and
December .
The six case studies (local arenas) are Gbarnga and Ganta (Liberia),
Gitega and Bubanza (Burundi), and Goma/Sake and Bukavu/Kalehe
(DRC). These localities exhibit important differences in their conﬂict
history and dynamics as well as popular perceptions of ‘peace’. In
fact, we found that peace can mean very different things to different
people. Therefore we are reluctant to formulate a one-ﬁts-all operatio-
nalisation of our dependent variable (local peacefulness). Instead we
use context-speciﬁc indicators for each case, inductively derived from
our empirical research. It is important to emphasise that we place a
modest standard on the expected pacifying effects of power-sharing
since we focus on relatively short transitional power-sharing processes.
We used the same methods (FGDs and interviews) with roughly the
same – contextually adapted – guidelines and chose interviewees with a
similar background (market women, youth and teachers for the FGDs,
local political, administrative, security and civil society elites for
individual interviews).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we
present the three country studies. For each one, we will ﬁrst sketch the
trajectory of the peace process and account for the power-sharing
content of the peace agreements. Secondly, we will establish the extent
and mechanisms through which the national peace and power-sharing
process was linked to the local level: considering not only whether local
concerns were included, but also to what degree the peace process
was explicitly or implicitly, formally or informally, extended to the sub-
national level. Thirdly, we consider whether peace has consistently
returned to both the national level and in the chosen two arenas – and
analyse the link between the outcome (peace or persistent armed
conﬂict on the local level) and the degree to which the local level was
taken into account in the peace process. We will compare and contrast
the results of this analysis in a ﬁnal section.
P O W E R - S H A R I N G I N A F R I C A ’ S W A R Z O N E S
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L I B E R I A
The Liberian civil war formally ended in August , when the govern-
ment of Liberia (GoL) and two insurgent groups, Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), signed the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) in Accra. The CPA stipulated a transitional unity
government (–), based on political power-sharing. This
included the cabinet, seats in the transitional Legislative Assembly and
other state institutions. Representatives of civil society and political
parties (who also signed the agreement) received a limited number of
posts. Economic power-sharing consisted mainly in the distribution of
directorship of parastatal companies amongst the different factions,
which became an important source of accumulation and patronage
(Hoffman : ; Sawyer : –). Military power-sharing was
not part of the agreement. Rather than amalgamating all existing groups
into a new national army the negotiators agreed to disband all armed
factions, before newly vetted army and police units were formed. The
implementation of the agreement was assisted by a , strong UN
peacekeeping mission (UNMIL), which began deployment shortly after
the CPA was signed.
Liberia has always politically been a highly centralised country.
Thus concerns and interests of local power-holders have a tendency to
be intertwined with national-level concerns. To this day a perception
remains salient, whereby Liberia is divided between its capital Monrovia
and the rest of the country, widely referred to as the hinterlands.
Grievances concerning land tenure, lack of infrastructure and unem-
ployment remain pervasive. However, whilst most rebel groups can
certainly be associated with speciﬁc regions of Liberia, they never
speciﬁcally fought for autonomy of their home regions, but rather for a
piece of the national cake. Unsurprisingly, therefore, perceptions of
peace at the local level were coupled to national dynamics, not locally
bounded conﬂicts. According to our interlocutors the most important
measure of local peace was the demobilisation of rebel groups and the
arrival of UNMIL groups. The gradual return of personal security and
the normalisation of everyday life were attributed to the national peace
process, its dynamics and key players.
Local power-sharing in Liberia
The sub-national level was barely involved, either during the peace
negotiations or the subsequent interim government. In terms of local
 C L A U D I A S I M O N S E T A L .
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content, neither Ganta nor Gbarnga, our arenas of analysis, were
directly represented in the Accra negotiations, neglecting both local
actors and their concerns. A number of civil society observers from these
arenas participated, though none of them speciﬁcally represented their
local home area (civil society activist July  int.; NGO director 
int.; Kidau  int.). It could be argued that both places were
represented to the extent that they counted (and still do) as strongholds
of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Party (NPP). Some interviewees
indeed felt that they were represented at the negotiations due to the
heavy inﬂuence of Taylor (e.g. NGO director  int., Mulbah 
int., Howard-Taylor  int.). Nonetheless, these opinions were held by
just a few, usually those still politically active with the NPP. Furthermore,
the CPA did not expressly target distinct local concerns, such as refugee
repatriation or pervasive land conﬂicts, challenges that would be left to
the new government, elected in . Informants in both Ganta and
Gbarnga complained about the inaction of the government regarding
these concerns. However, it was also suggested that repatriation, resettle-
ment and land issues were nationwide problems; that is, not considered
to be speciﬁc to Ganta or Gbarnga. This is likely to be related to
suppression of political identities and autonomy in the hinterlands
during the entire history of the Liberian state (Bøås ). By and large,
then, interviewees considered the power-sharing pact among elites as a
necessary evil.
In terms of local power-sharing, CPA negotiators explicitly decided
that power-sharing arrangements would not be extended locally,
thus anchoring transition politics ﬁrmly in Monrovia. According to the
current mayor of Ganta ‘the presence of the interim government was
not really felt here’ ( int.). This meant, for example, that local
government positions were not re-allocated. Likewise, power-sharing did
not involve territorial aspects in the form of decentralization, which
could have brought ‘the local’ back into the peace process. It could be
argued however, that some informal power-sharing took place, as the
Monrovia-based unity government did not try to remove local ofﬁcials
already present there. Pro-Taylor factions had recaptured Ganta, like
much of Nimba County, from LURD in the ﬁnal days of the war. The
local pro-Taylor commander, General Adolphus Dolo, appointed a new
mayor, who stayed in ofﬁce throughout the transition and was only
replaced in , by another former associate of Taylor.
These status quo politics, whilst partially a sign of central government
weakness, were also a deliberate, albeit informal, sharing of power by
attributing the regional monopoly of power to conﬂict parties. The area
P O W E R - S H A R I N G I N A F R I C A ’ S W A R Z O N E S
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was left to Taylor associates, while other parts of Liberia – such as
Voinjama – were left to associates of the LURD rebels. Given Ganta’s
reputation as a Taylor stronghold, the incoming transitional govern-
ment feared that too much interference could destabilise a fragile
situation. In the words of Senior Senator of Bong County, Jewel
Howard-Taylor, ‘During the interim government there was not really any
political decision making at the local level, they were just trying to keep
the peace’ ( int.).
Local peace in Liberia
From a macro-political perspective, many observers have regarded
Liberia’s transition process as a success (Harris ; Nilsson ). To
be sure, the transition experienced rampant corruption and it was
unable to lay the structural foundations for effective and reformed
statehood. In the wake of the ﬁrst post-war elections, the UN noted the
fragility of the security situation, pointing out regional volatility, weak
domestic security forces and limited government authority in most parts
of Liberia (UN Security Council ). Nonetheless, the resumption of
large-scale violence was avoided, arguably the key objective of the power-
sharing transition. Most CPA provisions were implemented and the
former enemies basically abided by the peace agreement, permitting
peaceful elections in  (Harris ; Sawyer ) and . It was
however due to the presence of UNMIL that further large-scale violence
was avoided, rather than the top-down imposition of power-sharing. At
the time of writing over , uniformed peacekeeping personnel
remain in the country; on the national scale the war as such has ended.
How does this situation of fragile peace relate to the local level?
Although the local level was at best marginally addressed, both in terms
of local content and local power-sharing, the situation in the towns of
Ganta and Gbarnga more or less mirrored the overall trend in the
country. A tacit form of peace emerged relatively quickly in the wake of
the CPA. Whilst the two arenas certainly remain more fragile to this day
compared with other parts of Liberia, neither of the two have faced
extreme violence since the end of the war either.
In Gbarnga, tensions persisted in the interim period prior to the
 elections. Disputes between members of the majority Kpelle
and the much smaller Mandingo ethnic group, perceived as supporters
of LURD, escalated into riots. It was UNMIL whomanaged to calm down
the situation. Disgruntled foot soldiers, whose commanders were
reaping the beneﬁts of power-sharing in Monrovia, continued to loot
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surrounding villages in the aftermath of the CPA. Nevertheless, accor-
ding to informants tensions abated considerably after the arrival of
UNMIL troops as early as December  and the subsequent dis-
armament process. Much like nationally in Liberia, it was UNMIL that
kept the peace after the CPA was signed (see above).
In Ganta a negligible degree of central control was exercised during
the interim government period. Power remained with former pro-Taylor
commanders who appointed a new mayor and replaced town chiefs with
former combatants (see also Munive : ). As perceived by local
residents, day-to-day insecurity continued during the interim period, but
the situation gradually improved with the deployment of UNMIL and
progress in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).
Nonetheless, one major exception came up in all the interviews and
focus groups, namely land-related conﬂict. Whilst this is not unique to
Ganta, it is certainly felt more strongly here than in Gbarnga. In a focus
group discussion with market women more than two thirds of the group
argued that land conﬂict continues to threaten peace in Ganta to this
day. Themayor, appointed by local commanders in , was said to have
exacerbated tensions by – at best – turning a blind eye to ex-combatants
(primarily from theGio andMande group) squatting on land and houses
belonging to Mandingo individuals, who had formed the majority within
LURD. More generally, the monopoly of pro-Taylor factions in Ganta
has reinforced a perception of marginalisation among the Mandingo
community (e.g. Mandingo Representative  int.). Ganta makes a
case for the lack of local content (land rights) and local power-sharing
being a factor in continued conﬂict. If power-sharing had been replicated
here, resulting in local balances of power with the Mandingo group
being included, thus potentially giving the resolution of land conﬂict a
fairer chance, the outcome on peace might have been different.
Nevertheless, with the notable exception of land conﬂict, residents of
Ganta feel that (negative) peace has largely returned. The peace has
been largely attributed to two factors. First, and only to a certain extent,
appeasing the elite’s appetite for a share of the cake had an immediate
effect throughout the country. Second, andwidely argued asmore impor-
tant by our informants, international peacekeepers had a signiﬁcant
impact. On-going local conﬂicts such as disputes between Kpelle and
Mandingo in Gbarnga were forcefully managed thanks to the extraver-
sion of security to UNMIL and international donors. The disarmament
of former combatants, including the foot soldiers, is widely seen as being
highly correlated with the resumption of local peace. To some extent,
therefore, peace was indeed imposed ‘from above’ – albeit not by central
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government in Monrovia, but by international actors, especially UNMIL.
In addition, one important detail was that Charles Taylor, a key player
during the wars ﬂed the country, thus decapitating one of the most
important ﬁghting factions.
In conclusion therefore, despite the exclusion of the local level (i.e.
local content) in the peace agreement and no local power-sharing,
peace has resumed in both Gbarnga and Ganta, due to other factors.
B U R U N D I
The civil war in Burundi that started in  can be characterised as
a multilayered conﬂict with different lines of confrontation. The most
obvious one opposed the former government, the Union pour le Progrès
National (UPRONA) with its all-Tutsi army, and Hutu rebel groups,
eager to gain a share of Burundi’s political, economic and military
power. In , the Arusha peace agreement was signed by a group of
Hutu parties (the ‘G’), under the lead of Front pour la Démocratie au
Burundi (FRODEBU) and a group of majority Tutsi parties (the ‘G’),
led by UPRONA. However, it was only in late  that the country’s
largest insurgent group, the Hutu-dominated Conseil National pour la
Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD)
signed a ceaseﬁre, thus joining power-sharing arrangements meant to
end over a decade of civil war. A second Hutu insurgent group, the Forces
Nationales de Libération (FNL), refused to disarm and only signed a peace
accord in .
Burundi is often presented as the most sophisticated and complete
case of power-sharing in Africa (Bentley & Southall ; Daley ;
Falch & Becker ). During the transition (–) a mixture of
political and ethnic power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi was estab-
lished. The National Assembly was enlarged in order to include all
parties to the Arusha agreement. Ministries were divided up between the
G and G parties, with a strong overrepresentation of the minority
Tutsi parties. When the CNDD–FDD joined in, the power-sharing
formula was adapted to include the newcomers in the institutions. By the
same token, military power-sharing was pursued in the national army,
with % of ofﬁcers now coming from the CNDD–FDD. The peace
process was ﬁrst overseen by South African peacekeepers, later replaced
by AU troops, followed in  by a UN peace operation comprised of
up to , blue helmets. However, these troops never had the same
strength as in Liberia.
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None of the conﬂict actors, relatively cohesive organisations with
strong hierarchical agency, claimed to defend the rights of the people of
a particular territory, but rather those of an ethnic group – groups which
have never been spatially segregated. Ordinary Hutu and Tutsi were
pitted against each other during the war years, ﬁghting an inter-group
conﬂict, related to both elite manipulation and individual motivations
that diverged from place to place (see e.g. Bentley & Southall ;
Lemarchand ). Ethnic heterogeneity as well as relevant conﬂict
issues such as land scarcity, lack of infrastructure or poverty, were rather
evenly distributed throughout the periphery. Therefore dynamics at the
sub-national level largely mirrored those at the national level, as in
Liberia. Accordingly, in the perception of our informants the most
important marker of local peace was the end of inter-ethnic hostilities
paired with the re-establishment of normalised everyday life (variously
expressed as the re-opening of ethnically mixed schools, being able to go
to the ﬁelds, going out at night, etc.).
Local power-sharing in Burundi
Dominated by national elites, Burundi’s peace negotiations and agree-
ments hardly exhibited local content. Neither locally deﬁned actors nor
locally speciﬁc concerns were taken into consideration in the peace
process as all issues tackled by the Arusha Agreement had a national
character. Only informally – and very marginally – was the territorial ad-
ministration the object of the negotiations, leading to some basic
forms of local power-sharing. Thus, tripartite local governments were
common, as for example in Bubanza, where the chief administrator and
his two deputy councillors came from different ethnic groups and
political parties ( Journalists  int.). However, the fact that conﬂict in
Gitega and Bubanza largely mirrored national dynamics meant that
tackling ethnic discrimination was both a national as well as a local
concern. Generally, genuine local content in national arrangements as
well as speciﬁcally local power-sharing only became important after the
transition, introducing a shift from political power-sharing to ethnic
power-sharing. This was partly driven by new laws addressing sub-
national politics. For example, elected communal councils now have to
reﬂect the ethnic diversity of their commune. Moreover, the new
constitution stipulates that governors must hail from the province they
administer, as well as establishes a Senate, composed of two locally
elected representatives for each province. In provinces like Bubanza,
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historically administered by individuals from the south, these new
regulations have enhanced a sense of ownership and representation.
In addition to the formal replication of power-sharing at the local level
and minor provisions of devolution, the idea of ethnic power-sharing
dominates informal institutions and events at the local level to this day.
Local peace in Burundi
Given the narrow objectives of the transition, the peace process in
Burundi counts as a success. Unity government survived the transition,
paving the way for the peaceful  elections, which delivered an
outright victory to the CNDD–FDD. Large-scale ﬁghting came to an end
once the CNDD–FDD joined the peace process. Conﬂict in the border
region with the DRC (including the province and town of Bubanza)
persisted on a lower level as the FNL continued to ﬁght. However the
group had lost its political rationale of protecting Hutu interests with the
inclusion of the CNDD–FDD in government. In general, the latter was
perceived as a victory of the Hutu majority after decades of ethnic
discrimination. At the same time, enough protective measures had been
offered to prevent UPRONA from derailing the process. Former Tutsi
presidents were given seats for lifetime in the senate and measures
were taken to guarantee a continuation of privileges – in some cases
‘even more privileges than before’ – for army ofﬁcers (civil society
activist  int.).
Although no coordinated effort to reconcile the population has
been undertaken, inter-ethnic suspicion has decreased. New conﬂicts
are largely fought along political lines, within the Hutu majority, that is
between the CNDD–FDD and its political – and partly armed –Hutu
opposition. Threats to peace have re-emerged in recent years, with the
state becoming a de facto (multi-ethnic) one-party state under the
control of the CNDD–FDD and growing political violence in all parts
of the country. Growing authoritarian tendencies of the dominant party
and its lack of tolerance of political opposition are beginning to
supplant encouraging beginnings of the peace process.
Gitega and Bubanza, major hotspots during the civil war, both closely
mirrored the political situation on the national level. In Gitega, the
accession of CNDD–FDD to the peace agreement was felt immediately,
leading to an end of violence almost overnight. War-time ethnic segre-
gation was abandoned and improvements in the cohabitation of Hutu
and Tutsi were visible almost at once. Many interviewees and focus
groups mentioned the end of the ‘balkanisation’ of Gitega as a sign of
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peace, using a term that is often used in the region (including in neigh-
bouring DRC) to describe ethnic (or political) segregation of territory.
In Bubanza, insecurity and violence persisted even after the accession
of the CNDD–FDD to the peace deal, due to the ongoing insurgency
of the FNL. In the local perception, the worst ﬁghting was over once
the CNDD–FDD had joined the peace process, as this meant an end to
the generalised discrimination of Hutu. This was conﬁrmed by a
transition senator, who acknowledged however that this impression
might be at least partly due to the CNDD–FDD’s propaganda, though
the CNDD–FDD did largely secure the area after  (, int.).
A former FRODEBU administrator of Bubanza concurred, noting: ‘the
FNL continued the armed struggle, but the worst was over in /’
(Bigimana  int.).
Local power-relations in Gitega and Bubanza changed in their
essence – in the sense that power was now shared between Hutu and
Tutsi – but not so much ‘in persona’. Most former administrative per-
sonnel had been killed, exiled, or held ofﬁce only for a short period of
time and many functions had been taken over by the army during the
conﬂict years. Thus, the new administrative power-holders in Gitega
faced little contestation, as they entered almost an administrational
vacuum. As the FNL was still active in Bubanza and has a strong base
there to this day, power-struggles between CNDD–FDD and FNL soon
became the norm, one reason why the area remains tense to this day.
As shown, local actors were hardly involved in the negotiations, which
were dominated by national political and military elites. However, the
idea of ethnic power-sharing soon started penetrating all levels of the
polity, including Gitega and Bubanza, for several reasons.
First, although Burundi’s political history has been deeply inﬂuenced
by a strong regional bias favouring its southern part, the country’s social
structures imply that political actors, including the rebellions, are not
primarily associated with speciﬁc regions and localities. Similarly to
Liberia, this in a sense pre-empts spatial-regional factors to inﬂuence
political dynamics. Local cleavages generally tend to mirror cleavages on
a national level. From  onwards, the main structural cause of the
conﬂict – ethnic discrimination – was extensively addressed. The trans-
formation of the army – the main means of oppression during decades
of Tutsi rule – into a multi-ethnic institution appeased the situation
throughout the country. Transforming the Hutu–Tutsi cleavage was
possible without speciﬁcally considering the local level from the outset.
Once the idea of power-sharing had gained traction among elites, it
soon trickled down to the most local level, arguably having a very positive
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effect on the cohabitation of Hutu and Tutsi in both Gitega and
Bubanza.
Second, Burundi historically exhibits a strong culture of political
centralisation. Political organisations traditionally have strong hierar-
chies. This of course does not mean that there are no splits within
given movements. After all, the CNDD–FDD was a splinter group of
FRODEBU and further split into the CNDD and the CNDD–FDD
during the peace talks. After  the CNDD–FDD experienced further
splits – at times regionally motivated (Nindorera ). However, these
dynamics were not caused by the exclusion of certain localities from the
peace talks or government institutions. Rather, different factions split
over whether moderate or radical demands and actions were better
suited to succeed and disagreed on key issues, mostly concerning details
of army integration (see Bentley & Southall : ).
The limited extent of local power-sharing did not really inﬂuence
these dynamics, questioning the claim that peace cannot be imposed
from above. In the cases where local power-sharing had been imposed
by the national elites it has worked rather smoothly.
In summary, local peace in Burundi, as in Liberia, seems to have been
the product of national power-sharing –most importantly the creation
of a multi-ethnic army – as well as a number of related factors. They
include the magnetic attraction of the CNDD–FDD for other Hutu (and
Tutsi) elites once the group joined the process, the CNDD–FDD’s near
certainty to win the elections, and trust in Tutsi elites, or their inability to
undermine the peace process due to strong international/regional
pressure. What is important in the Burundian case however is that due to
the centralised nature of the state and the even distribution of ethnic
heterogeneity as well as the similarity of grievances across the country,
‘local’ and ‘national’ tend to blur when it comes to conﬂict manage-
ment. This is in stark contrast to the DRC, as we will show in the next
section.
D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C O F C O N G O
Intertwined armed conﬂicts have raged in the DRC since the mid-s
(e.g. Tull & Mehler ; Prunier ). Since , the war primarily
pitted the government against the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Démocratie (RCD), largely (but not exclusively) associated with
Rwanda and the Rwandophone ethnic communities in North and South
Kivu. Apart from the RCD a plethora of other armed groups emerged
during the war claiming to represent different constituencies and
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forming complex and sometimes counter-intuitive alliances with each
other.
Only in , after four years of negotiations, and parallel agreements
with Rwanda and Uganda, did the regional war ofﬁcially end. A
peace accord with a far-reaching system of transitional power-sharing
was signed by President Kabila and the main rebel groups, RCD,
Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) and RCD–Mouvement de
Libération (RCD–ML). The power-sharing provisions covered political,
military, and economic dimensions. The presidency was shared between
Kabila and four vice-presidents from the RCD, MLC and political
opposition. Similar rules were applied to the National Assembly and the
(newly created) Senate, a number of other transitional institutions,
parastatal companies (i.e. economic power-sharing) and the army
(i.e. military power-sharing). It was a ﬁnely tuned architecture to main-
tain a balance of power. Ministers and Deputy Ministers never came
from the same faction.
Local power-sharing in DRC
Amongst the three countries studied, the peace process in DRC
included by far the highest degree of ‘local content’, with the speciﬁc
inclusion of local actors and concerns as well as a replication of power-
sharing at the local level. This comes as no surprise, as the DRC is the
biggest and most diverse in terms of geography and population. Given
the fact that the war in DRC has always had a very strong territorial
(regional as well as local) component, power-sharing at the national
level almost inevitably included local content. Although the groups that
took part in the talks have to be considered as national elites, they also
had local roots that cannot be divorced from their political interests and
strategies. The transition and power-sharing process at the national level
also took account of important sub-national concerns. This included the
Congolese citizenship of the Rwandophone minorities in the Kivu
provinces (Banyarwanda), a very speciﬁc local issue that was put forward
by the RCD insurgency, given the Rwandophone origins of many of its
leaders and followers. This led to a new inclusive citizenship law to
accommodate the Banyarwanda. A second topic with strong sub-national
ramiﬁcations was decentralisation. During the negotiations of the trans-
itional government for a new constitution, adopted by popular refer-
endum before the end of the transition in late , the RCD advocated
the introduction of federalism as a remedy for the country’s long-
standing and defunct centralised political system (Le Potentiel ).
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Although federalism was not adopted, bargaining resulted (de jure) in a
strongly decentralised political system.
National power-sharing, as stipulated by the peace agreement, was
replicated on the sub-national level in each province. Important posts
in the administration and security sector were to be ﬁlled by a triad of
conﬂict actors. Governors, local administrators and provincial represen-
tatives of national institutions, including police and army, were all
subject to this sophisticated power-sharing scheme. All locally relevant
ﬁgures were thus somehow accommodated. This is important, as we
would assume that accommodation prevents the emergence of splits
amongst local elites.
In contrast to neighbouring Burundi, both actors and conﬂict
concerns were very much territorially differentiated. The interests of
local actors in North and South Kivu were manifold and included both
the protection of economic interests and their ethnic constituencies, to
name just a few. The heavy involvement of external actors (mainly
Rwanda and Uganda as well as international business elites) further-
more complicates the picture. Given the sheer size of the country and its
(human-) geographical heterogeneity, the interests of powerful local
actors depended on the control of speciﬁc territories. The local there-
fore had very different implications in the Congolese peace process than
in Burundi and Liberia.
Local peace in DRC
On the national level, the peace agreement quickly yielded positive
results. Organised ﬁghting largely ended and the conﬂict parties took
up their positions in the central government and other state institutions.
Virtually all informants mentioned the reuniﬁcation of the country –
hitherto divided among the warring factions – and the resulting freedom
of movement as a major achievement of the peace agreement. The ﬁrst
democratic elections since  took place peacefully and orderly in
, marking the end to the transition. The largest UN peacekeeping
mission worldwide accompanied the peace process and transition with
around , personnel. Despite the large size of the mission, it has
remained largely ineffective in securing the peace in the region.
In the wake of the power-sharing agreement, peace did not unfold in
a uniform fashion across the entire territory of the DRC. The provinces
of North and South Kivu, where the war had originated, remained zones
of pervasive insecurity and violence, including our units of analysis,
Goma and Sake (North Kivu) and Bukavu and Kalehe (South Kivu).
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Sake has often been under cross-ﬁre from government soldiers
and the various rebel movements. This most recently became apparent
during the rebellion of the M, an offshoot of the Conseil National pour
la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). Starting in the spring , it brieﬂy seized
control of Goma and Sake.
Kalehe, just as Bukavu, saw severe ﬁghting between government
troops, the RCD and Rwandan insurgents of the Forces Démocratique de
Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mai-Mai militias throughout the
war. Despite experiencing heavy violence in many parts of North and
South Kivu – including Sake and Kalehe – the situation improved to one
of relative calm, in the ﬁnal days of the war.
In both arenas however, armed ﬁghting resumed during or in the
immediate aftermath of the transition. In Kalehe, heavy ﬁghting erupted
in  during the so-called ‘war of Bukavu’ when hundreds of people
were displaced, raped and killed in a matter of few weeks. The war was
fought between the army and a breakaway faction of the RCD, later to be
renamed CNDP, led by Laurent Nkunda. Nkunda had been offered
several posts in Kinshasa during the peace process, but decided to stay in
the Kivus to safeguard the RCD’s local power monopoly. The other
faction of the RCD, led by Azarias Ruberwa, took up posts in the unity
government, with Ruberwa becoming Congo’s Vice-President. Thus, the
mere inclusion of local actors, such as the RCD leadership around its
then President Ruberwa, is no guarantee for local peace. In fact such
inclusion rests on the assumption of a high degree of cohesiveness of any
given insurgent group. However, the DRC case shows that this is by no
means always the case.
Kalehe was at that time occupied by Nkunda’s troops, causing new
violent clashes with the Mai-Mai militia and the government army. After
a few months, the CNDP retreated to North Kivu, were it effectively
established a ‘state within a state’.
During this time, a frontline between the CNDP and the government
troops also directly ran through Sake. People in Sake stated that things
only got better after , when a peace agreement between Kabila and
the CNDP ended the ﬁghting, de facto again granting the rebels an
unofﬁcial monopoly. Most interviewees and all focus groups agree that
the peripheries surrounding Sake were not really secured: ‘Sake town is
safe, but there is war in the hills’ (Local Government Ofﬁcial  int.).
The same is true for Kalehe, where respondents mainly mentioned the
Rwandan FDLR militia as a threat. These very tangible threats – killings,
lootings, harassment, rape – paired with a feeling of being constantly
governed by ‘foreigners’ were the indicators for non-peacefulness given
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by the non-Tutsi community in both Sake and Kalehe. In fact, peace-
fulness has a very particular connotation for the communities in those
areas where actual ﬁghting among conﬂict actors and against the civilian
population has been linked to struggles for the monopoly over territory
and local resources. The calm following the monopolisation of power by
one particular actor never meant peace for all, but only for some.
How are these dynamics related to the local implementation of power-
sharing? The elaborate local power-sharing formula in DRC met
an uneven fate in practice. In North Kivu, the RCD effectively worked
to undermine the scheme, keeping almost exclusive control over all
posts and levers of power. Ofﬁcials sent from the Kabila faction were not
able to work effectively, sometimes denied access to ofﬁces and infor-
mation or were killed (Journalist , int.; Researcher , int.). The
posts of governor as well as the regional military commander were
retained by the RCD, and their second-in-commands were not able to
effectively counterbalance their power. This informal, de facto monopo-
list situation became ofﬁcial when President Kabila conﬁrmed Eugène
Serufuli as governor of North Kivu, a position the RCD heavyweight had
occupied since . According to many observers in Goma, Kabila had
little choice but to accept the RCD’s power in the region (Researcher
, int.; Journalist , int.). North Kivu was kept under RCD
control and until the end of the transition things remained relatively
calm in the run-up to the  elections. The RCD, now a political party,
received a beating at the polls, especially in the areas it had controlled
since , effectively ending its political life. Led by Nkunda, parts of
the RCD responded with a renewed rebellion (the CNDP), taking
control over large areas of North Kivu.
In South Kivu, the RCD was far less entrenched, meeting signiﬁcant
local resistance. Initially, some degree of power-sharing took place on
political, administrative and military levels in the province. The uneasy
coexistence between representatives of the RCD and (primarily) Kabila
loyalists collapsed in May  when rival army units clashed in Bukavu.
The episode and its consequences nearly led to the breakdown of unity
government in Kinshasa (Tull ). In the aftermath of this crisis,
power-sharing was effectively terminated in South Kivu as the RCD was
forced to leave the province to Kabila’s allies. Those RCD elements
that remained in South Kivu kept a low proﬁle, effectively bending to the
will of the Kabila dominated majority. Many cadres left the movement
(Journalist Bukavu , int.).
In summary, the situation in North and South Kivu during the
transition was in contradiction to the national power-sharing accord.
 C L A U D I A S I M O N S E T A L .
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 22 Apr 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
Both provinces were under the control of a monopolist, with the RCD in
charge of the former and the Kabila faction of the latter. After initial
power struggles until mid-, monopolist control had a somewhat
pacifying effect on both provinces, at least until the end of the transition
in late . Fighting broke out again when this monopoly was
threatened after the elections in .
Thus power-sharing in DRC yields unexpected consequences. The
CNDP emerged as a challenger to the supposed peace in North Kivu,
despite signiﬁcant offers of inclusion for its leaders in the national peace
deal. Alleged political grievances such as citizenship concerns were
addressed in the peace agreement. This did not however lead to local
peace. In fact, it seems that these concerns – albeit important for the
local population – were not determinant for rebel elites, or at least that
motivations had changed over time. Control over resources – economic
and political – remains at the heart of this conﬂict. Local power-sharing
threatened the monopoly over resources of one of the most important
conﬂict actors, Rwandophone networks of elites, and thus had no
chance to survive. When in  the informal monopoly of the CNDP
was again threatened, the M rebellion emerged.
A N A L Y S I S
A close look at six sub-national arenas in three major war zones in Africa
reveals that the political trajectory of these former violent hotspots
largely mirrors the overall trend on the national level, at least in the
immediate post-agreement period. The positive trend of national peace,
illustrated by the formation of unity government and the absence of
organised ﬁghting, was not decoupled on the local level in four of six
cases.
Looking at the empirical sub-national record in Liberia and Burundi,
national power-sharing (which had provided ample incentives for
elites), directly or indirectly, had a positive impact on local peace and
security, despite the fact that power-sharing was not signiﬁcantly and
formally extended to the local level. One explanation might be the (lack
of) spatial-regional political dominance of any of the conﬂict parties,
most clearly the case in Burundi. In Liberia, despite stronger spatial-
regional dominance, this was never the goal of the conﬂict parties.
Furthermore, centuries of centralisation policies no doubt also played a
role. In Burundi, the transformation of ethnic grievances at the national
level was positively mirrored locally. In Liberia, the power-sharing
formula managed to appease the conﬂict parties’ quest for power.
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As numerous interviews and focus groups discussions made clear, almost
without exception, the sharp reduction or even absence of violence was
positive and promising, but the situation remains fragile. These coun-
tries undoubtedly experience ‘negative peace’, to paraphrase Galtung
(), describing merely the absence of violence. Unresolved struc-
tural problems remain. The fact that local concerns and actors were
generally excluded could yet negatively affect the transformation of
these countries in the coming years.
We conclude that elite-based power-sharing as a broad formula was
instrumental in sharply reducing violence in these cases and instigating
a de-militarisation of political conﬂict, even though at considerable
costs (no reconciliation, impunity etc.). Power-sharing was only one, but
an important part of the story. Numerous other factors certainly played a
role in support of the process, which we have not the space to analyse
fully here, including the small size of Burundi and Liberia, combined
with the relatively large size of peacekeeping troops (especially in
Liberia).
The difference between the types of local power-sharing, whether
reproducing the same power balances as on the level of the national
state, or establishing monopolies by one group are signiﬁcant. In
Burundi, the former had a positive inﬂuence on peace, especially in the
post-interim period. In Ganta, Liberia, the status quo arrangements
maintained the monopoly of power by pro-Taylor factions. This has
arguably led to pervasive low-intensity land conﬂict, due to a lack of local
power-balance.
In DRC, de facto monopolies of power on the local level and in
various regions seem to have contributed to some kind of fragile peace,
although it is very differently perceived among local communities. None-
theless, every time a local monopoly was threatened, renewed ﬁghting
broke out. This was the case in , in  and in .
Overall, we have found little conﬁrmation for the view that promoting
power-sharing to achieve peace requires its extension or reproduction
on the sub-national level. This can be explained with respect to Burundi
and Liberia, small and centralised countries with relatively cohesive
conﬂict actors, where the boundaries between ‘local’ and ‘national’
dimensions are blurred. Exclusive national power-sharing may work
relatively effectively despite – or perhaps because of – the fact that it is
limited to national elites in capital cities, at least in the short term. In
both Burundi and Liberia, the fact that no local power-sharing evolved
from the respective peace processes, nor included much local content,
did not seem to have a overtly negative impact in the short-run. In
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contrast, in the large and heterogeneous DRC, local concerns and actors
were included. Local forms of power-sharing were stipulated by the
peace process, but they were either too contested, thus pre-empting
implementation (Sake/North-Kivu), or led to renewed violence (South
Kivu/Kalehe).
These conclusions run counter to the often-made claim that the local
level needs to be taken into account to build peace. Our ﬁndings suggest
that local political actors have far less political autonomy than recent
scholarship on local peace-building suggests in small and historically
highly centralised states such as Burundi, where national elites exert a
strong grip over local politics – at least in the face of short-term trans-
ition periods. Broken links between the political centre and local arenas
as a result of years of violent conﬂict, where entire regions either
escaped the control of the political centre or where central authority was
simply limited (as can be seen in the DRC) is a different matter. Liberia
shows how a robust international military presence can successfully
suppress renewed armed conﬂict at the local level despite the absence of
central (national) authorities.
Generally, our cases lead us to reconsider the idea of local conﬂict
causes. We have seen that the accommodation of elite interests was
conducive to peace in Liberia despite the exclusion of pressing concerns
such as unemployment and land conﬂict. These were however seen as
national grievances, not local ones. In Burundi, the main interest of the
conﬂict parties – access to power for one and the securing of power for
the other – was somewhat congruent with the solution of the major
cause of the conﬂict, namely ending ethnic discrimination. In the DRC
the tackling of conﬂict concerns speciﬁc to particular localities – such as
the citizenship question – was not sufﬁcient to bring peace. The main
interest of powerful local actors in North and South Kivu was, and
remains, not so much the tackling of structural problems or access to
national institutions, but their monopoly over the area – which is
threatened rather than secured by local power-sharing. Our cases thus
suggest, ﬁrst, that the ‘local’ in ‘local concerns’ can mean very different
things. Whereas local concerns were similar throughout the country in
Liberia and Burundi, they were very much bound to speciﬁc territories
in the DRC. Second, the inclusion of local conﬂict actors and concerns
in national peace agreements does not in itself constitute a guarantee
for peace at the local level. Local concerns (or grievances) are often just
a mobilising factor at the hand of local elites. And the inclusion of local
elites in national negotiations may not solve conﬂicts effectively as those
elites are by no means uncontested locally or else are not able to rein in
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rival elites in the conﬂict zones. The case of DRC leads us to a third
conclusion: we have to clearly distinguish between local power-balance
in the sense of a reproduction of the national power-sharing at the local
level and the granting of local power-monopolies as a second form of
power-sharing. The latter has partly appeased the situation during
rather brief periods, whereas the former had negative effects in both
North and South Kivu during the transition. Thus one could argue that
more and not less power-sharing was necessary in the DRC – albeit in the
form of a local monopoly. But even this arrangement remained fragile
and has pre-empted renewed ﬁghting only in the medium term. The
results presented thus far derive from our research in three African
countries, but it would of course be desirable and necessary to examine
more cases of local power-sharing, in Africa and elsewhere, in order to
evaluate the validity of our analysis.
Peacebuilding efforts at the local level tend to be romanticised as
almost necessarily peace-enhancing. The Congolese example shows how
the introduction of local power-sharing can actually lead to renewed
conﬂict instead of ameliorating the situation. The local balancing of
power, observed in post-transition Burundi, may improve matters, but
this is not necessarily so, as the DRC painfully underlines. Context plays
a crucial role. Generally, the three countries under consideration suggest
that the generalised use of the term ‘local’ is problematic. Local content
as well as local power-sharing meant very different things in each case.
Issues that may in fact need to be considered are the history of spatial-
political links, the centralised politics of caring about the periphery as
well as the establishment of local balances or monopolies of power.
N O T E S
. For details on our case selection see Simons & Zanker ().
. In some areas, ﬁghters did not really play an important role, thus status quo arrangements can
be traced to the weakness of the interim government.
. All three focus groups and most interviewees in Bubanza stressed this as a major improvement.
. Mai-Mai militias, civil society groups and political parties also signed but had much less agency
during the negotiations as well as in the subsequent institutions than the armed conﬂict parties.
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